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The Admiralty Doctrine of Laches
Uisdean R. Vass*
Xia Chen**
INTRODUCTION***
This article is an analysis of the admiralty doctrine of laches, the
historical development of that doctrine, the changes of the twentieth
century, the current law, and a brief policy analysis. Laches is basically
an equitable doctrine of time-bar: "Laches is a flexible measure of the
time within which a claim in admiralty must be asserted."' The doctrine
has played an essential role in American admiralty law, because up until
recently there were few fixed prescriptive periods for admiralty causes.
This article focuses specifically on the doctrine of laches in the admiralty
area; it does not address laches as discussed in other areas of federal
or state law. However, to the extent that non-admiralty laches cases
have had an impact on admiralty law, reference will be made to such
decisions.2
* Uisdean R. Vass, a Scottish lawyer and Louisiana attorney, and graduate of the
University of Edinburgh Faculty of Law and Louisiana State University Law School,
practices law with Clyde & Co., a City of London law firm. Mr. Vass, who works with
Clyde & Co.'s Latin American, North American, and Energy teams, will shortly join his
firm's new international office in Caracas, Venezuela.
** Xia Chen, Lecturer in Law, Fudan University, Shanghai, P.R. of China; M.
Law, Shanghai Maritime Institute, 1986; LL.M. in Admiralty, Tulane Law School, 1990;
candidate for SJD in Admiralty, Tulane Law School.
*** This article has, as its genesis, research on the issue of laches which Mr. Vass
undertook while practicing as an associate with the law firm of Stone, Pigman, Walther,.
Wittmann & Hutchinson in New Orleans, Louisiana.
1. Florida Bahamas Lines Ltd. v. The Steel Barge "Star 800" Inc., 433 F.2d 1243,
1250 (5th Cir. 1970).
2. For a broader review of laches, see Thomas G. Robinson, Comment, Laches In
Federal Substantive Law: Relation To Statutes Of Limitation, 56 B.U. L. Rev. 970 (1976).
Laches, in the non-admiralty context, arises in areas such as intellectual property, con-
stitutional law, and employment discrimination. Factually, these areas are very different
from admiralty. Additionally, cases in such areas do not ascribe the importance admiralty
courts do to the passing of analogous prescriptive periods. Still, the essential concept of
laches is the same, and there is much legal cross-fertilization. Laches in the laws of the
various states is subject to slight variation. Interestingly, Louisiana apparently has no
doctrine of laches. See Louisiana Civil Code article 3457 ("There is no prescription other
than that established by legislation"); Corbello v. Sutton, 446 So. 2d 301, 302 (La. 1984)
("-we hold that the doctrine of laches has no place in this state-").
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This article is divided into six parts. Part I covers the initial de-
velopment of the laches doctrine from the earliest days of the American
Republic up until the nineteen twenties. Part II focuses on the impact
of McGrath v. Panama Railroad Co., a highly regarded Fifth Circuit
case decided in 1924. 3 Part III charts the end of the McGrath era from
the Supreme Court's decision in Gardner v. Panama Railroad Co., and
reviews some further interpretative decisions handed down in the nineteen
fifties and sixties. 4 Part IV analyzes some important, recent authorities.
Part V is a synopsis of current doctrine. Lastly, Part VI is a brief
policy analysis.
Originally, admiralty courts were wary of allowing plaintiffs to delay
suits for a period longer than that allowed under analogous state or
federal laws. This reticence, perhaps reinforced by conservative decisions
such as McGrath, continued well into the twentieth century. However,
in the wake of Gardner v. Panama Railroad Co., courts have held that
the passing of the analogous state or federal prescriptive period serves
only to shift the laches burden to the plaintiff. The various appellate
circuits, however, have disagreed on the nature of this burden. Most
circuits hold that a plaintiff, after the passing of the analogous pre-
scriptive period, need only "show" either lack of inexcusable delay or
lack of prejudice. Other circuits take the opposite position, i.e., that
the plaintiff must prove both elements. Still other courts have said that
the elements should not be viewed independently, but are, in some sense,
legally interrelated. There is general agreement that if the analogous
prescriptive period has not passed, the defendant has the dual burden
of proving both inexcusable delay and lack of prejudice.
In more recent times, courts have tended to focus on the issue of
prejudice, more than on delay. Claims of prejudice are now subject to
close scrutiny, even in cases where plaintiffs bear the burden of proof.
And it is important to understand that the two elements of laches must
be causally related. To prove laches it must be shown that but for the
delay, the defendant would not have suffered prejudice. The view of
the authors, more fully explained in the policy review section, is that
it is difficult to justify the current doctrine of laches on policy grounds,
at least with regard to in personam actions.
Finally, a few words about the authors' analytical approach, and
the nature of the subject matter. There have been hundreds of reported
admiralty cases discussing laches since the inception of the Republic.
The writers do not attempt a comprehensive coverage of all the juris-
prudence. Instead, the evolution of the doctrine is traced through the
most important, or the most discursive and interesting, of the authorities.
3. 298 F. 303 (5th Cir. 1926).
4. 342 U.S. 29, 72 S. Ct. 12 (1951).
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And laches itself is an ancient equitable defense. Courts rarely make
swift radical changes in such ancient doctrines. Innovations in laches
have generally been glacial, with legal emphases altering slowly over the
years. There is great, though not unlimited, room for judicial discretion.
L The Initial Development of the Doctrine
Laches is a particular application of the Latin maxim "vigilantibus
non dormientibus aequitas subvenit" (equity aids the vigilant, not those
who sleep on their rights).5 The word "laches" is itself of Latin origin,
deriving from the word "laxus," which means "lax." '6 Laches may have
existed in Roman law, though this is not certain.7 Apparently, laches
appeared in English equity, before it emerged in the seventeenth century,
as being the rule of prescription in admiralty.' Justice Story imported
the doctrine into the jurisprudence of the fledgling American Republic
in 1815. 9 Possibly the most significant early authority, however, also
rendered by Justice Story, was Willard v. Dorr,10 a fascinating case
from an historical as well as legal perspective.
In Willard, Captain William Dorr, master of the "Jenny," set sail
from Boston in 1807 on a voyage to China. After calling into Fiji in
May 1808, and disembarking the principal part of the ship's cargo, the
vessel continued on its way to China. Because of bad weather, however,
and the onset of the monsoon season, the ship put into Guam for
additional supplies. Further cargo was on-loaded in Guam, and the
"Jenny" again sailed for China. On December 27, 1808, the "Jenny"
was captured by a British warship and taken to Calcutta, India for
adjudication."
The Vice Admiralty Court in Calcutta ordered the sale of the "Jenny"
and her cargo. Captain Dorr remained in Calcutta to handle the legal
and other affairs of the ship. After the rendering of an adverse ruling
by the Vice Admiralty Court, he filed an appeal, upon which he returned
to Boston. His appeal was successful, and restitution of the sale proceeds
of the ship, cargo and freight was ordered by the High Court of
5. Cited in Stone v. Williams, 873 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
959, 110 S. Ct. 377, vacated on other grounds, 891 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989).
6. James Hanemann, Jr., Comment, Admiralty: The Doctrine of Laches, 37 Tul.
L. Rev. 811 (1963).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 812.
9. Brown v. Jones, 4 F. Cas. 404 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 2017). See also discussion
id. at 812-13.
10. 3 Mason 161 (1823).
11. In 1808, the British were at war with the French Empire. The United States did
not join the war until 1812, however, and so the arrest of the "Jenny" was the seizure
of a neutral ship.
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Admiralty in Calcutta on May 16, 1811. But before the proceeds could
be returned to the rightful owners, war broke out between the United
States and Britain, resulting in the suspension of all further proceedings
until 1815. Captain Dorr left the United States in 1810 and never
returned. He died in 1813. The sale proceeds were not finally received
in America until November, 1816.
Captain Dorr's successor brought suit against the owners of the
"Jenny" for, inter alia, the captain's wages for the voyage as far as
Guam or capture, his services in Calcutta, and the cost of his voyage
home. There had been a delay in filing suit of more than twelve years
from the end of the voyage.
The case appeared before the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in
Boston. Mr. Justice Story rendered the opinion. The court began by
noting that "there is [sic] no prescribed limits beyond which, in the
exercise of admiralty jurisdiction, the courts of the United States may
not take cognizance of suits. .... ,,2 But despite this lack of definitive
maritime prescription, Justice Story went on to state: "Where there are
no positive bars, presumptions are often indulged, which are equally
fatal to a recovery."' 3 The court went on to hold that in admiralty a
suit should not be allowed after the passing of the appropriate analogous
state statute of limitations absent "special circumstances, constituting a
just exception. . .. 4
The court found that the facts at issue constituted such a "special
circumstance." Justice Story noted that Captain Dorr had properly
fulfilled his duty to stay in Calcutta until the filing of the appeal and
that his right to wages, at least for that part of the voyage beyond
Fiji, would have been subject to great controversy prior to the success
of his appeal in the High Court of Admiralty. The court further found
that the Captain probably never knew of the success of his appeal, and
that the circumstances suggested "that the parties were willing to leave
the claims of Captain Dorr to be adjusted upon the final event of the
appeal. .. ."
Willard was a reasonably liberal application of the laches doctrine.
The court might easily have focused on Captain Dorr's failure to sue
for his wages up until his ship's arrival in Fiji. Perhaps the court might
have looked to when Captain Dorr's successor found'out about the
successful appeal in Calcutta. Indeed, the "just exception" test was per
12. Willard, 3 Mason at 164.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 168.
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se a rather liberal formulation, especially given the laissez faire spirit
of the times. 16
The same judge, however, adopted a somewhat more conservative
approach in The Brig Sarah Ann. 7 In that case, the libelants were
insurers of the subject vessel which went aground on the Island of
Nantucket in 1828. The owners promptly abandoned the ship, offering
title to the insurers. The insurers refused the offer, which, however,
was not explicitly withdrawn. Ultimately, the insurers did accept the
offer. The master of the "Sarah Ann," however, had previously sold
the vessel to a third party, allegedly on the basis of necessity. Libelants
were assigned title to the vessel in October, 1828, but suit was not
brought until September, 1834.
In consideration of the claimants' laches argument, Justice Story
stated:
Now, Courts of Admiralty, like Courts of Equity, govern them-
selves in the maintenance of suits by the analogies of the common
law limitations; and are not inclined, unless under very strong
circumstances, to depart from those limitations." s
The court was therefore inclined to find the claim time-barred. But
in absence of adequate allegations in the record specifying inexcusable
delay, it was found that laches could not be applied to the facts at
issue. 9 The "very strong circumstances" test of The Brig Sarah Ann,
however, appears more restrictive than the "just exception" formulation
of Willard v. Dorr.
The most notable authority on the doctrine of laches from the last
century is the United States Supreme Court case of Young v. The Key
City.20 This case involved the prosecution of a maritime lien against a
vessel which had lost a shipment of the libelant's wheat in transit. Two
years after the loss, the Northwestern Packet Company, the ship owner,
merged its business with a trade competitor. It was well-known at the
16. It is interesting to note that the court held that the Captain's successor could
recover for Dorr's "services, as master, in effecting the appeal and procuring the necessary
papers, and for the necessary promulgation of his stay at Calcutta for these purposes."
Id. at 167. However, claims for other agency work performed by the Captain in Calcutta
were held non-cognizable in admiralty jurisdiction. The same principle, viz, that a ship
agent's contract with his principal is not cognizable in admiralty, remains, though much
criticized, the law to this day. See, e.g., E.S. Binnings, Inc. v. M/V Saudi Rujadh, 815
F.2d 660 (lth Cir. 1987); Outbound Maritime Corp. v. P.T. Indonesian Consortium of
Constr. Indus., 582 F. Supp. 1136 (D.Md. 1984).
17. 2 Sum. 206 (1835).
18. Id. at 212 (emphasis added).
19. Justice Story found the argument of laches foreclosed because of the same reason
in The Barque Chusan, 2 Story 455, 469 (1843).
20. 81 U.S. 653, 14 Wall. 896 (1871).
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time of the merger that the owners of the "Key City" were exposed
to substantial indebtedness. Accordingly, the new corporation issued
stock to the former shareholders of Northwestern Packet Company with
the proviso that no dividends would be paid until the former company's
debts were met out of the net profits of the new corporation attributable
to the Northwestern Packet shareholders.
Libelants delayed filing suit until three and a half years after the
loss of the grain, and eighteen months after the merger of the ship
owner with its trade competitor. The suit was dismissed on grounds of
laches in the United States District Court for the District of Wisconsin,
which judgment was affirmed on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Appeal was then taken to the Supreme Court.
Justice Miller, rendering the opinion of the Court, reversed the
dismissal of the libel. After a review of previous authorities, the Court
laid down the following principles as governing the scope of laches in
the context of maritime liens:
1. That while the courts of admiralty are not governed in such
cases by any statute of limitation, they adopt the principle that
laches or delay in the judicial enforcement of maritime liens
will, under proper circumstances, constitute a valid defence [sic].
2. That no arbitrary or fixed period of time has been, or will
be, established as an inflexible rule, but that the delay which
will defeat such a suit must in every case depend on the peculiar
equitable circumstances of that case.
3. That where the lien is to be enforced to the detriment of a
purchaser for value, without notice of the lien, the defence [sic]
will be held valid under shorter time, and a more rigid scrutiny
of the circumstances of the delay, than when the claimant is
the owner at the time the lien accrued. 21
Justice Miller's third precept directly bore on the gravamen of the
claimants' laches argument, which sought to portray the new merged
corporation as an innocent successor in title without notice of encum-
brances. This ground of prejudice was a dominant factor favoring a
finding of laches in many of the earlier cases. 22 The Court, however,
found that the principle was not applicable in the instant case, because
the new corporation had taken ownership of the "Key City" with
21. Id. at 660, 14 Wall. at 898.
22. See, e.g., The Brig Sarah Ann, 2 Sum at 211. "Now, I agree to the doctrine
stated at the bar, that if an owner stands by, and knowingly suffers an innocent person,
without giving him notice of his title, to purchase his property, and to be mislead by
his silence in not asserting that title .. a Court of Equity ... will treat it as a fraud
upon the purchaser, and grant an injunction against the positive assertion of that title."
See also The Barque Chusan, 2 Story at 468; The Scow Bolivar, I Olcott 474 (1847).
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adequate notice of the serious extent of the previous owner's indebt-
edness, and had even engineered a stock plan to cover possible future
losses. It was also noted that the new corporation had paid nothing for
the assets of the old shipowner.
In the Key City, the Supreme Court declined an opportunity to
formulate more specific guidelines for the laches analysis. Other than
stating that every case depends on its "peculiar equitable circum-
stance[si," the Court merely emphasized that "innocent purchaser" prej-
udice should firmly tilt the balance towards an application of the laches
doctrine. Nonetheless, the Court's careful search for, and failure to find,
any suffered prejudice served to predate the emphasis which later courts
would place on prejudice over delay.
In light of the Supreme Court's failure to lay down more specific
guidelines in the Key City, subsequent courts found the latitude to
fashion varying, and sometimes conflicting, approaches. In Scull v.
Raymond, for instance, the district court for the Southern District of
New York formulated a restrictive interpretation of the laches defense.23
In Scull, the basic dispute arose from a collision in October, 1872,
involving the schooner "William Wallace" and the steamer "Zodiac."
The owners of the schooner filed an in rem action against the "Zodiac"
five days later. The arrest of "Zodiac" was lifted after a stipulation
had been entered by the New York & New Bern Steam-Ship Company,
claimant and part-owner. The other part-owner, a New York merchant
named Raymond, also appeared as claimant, but did not enter into the
stipulation. Final decree was awarded in favor of libelants in 1880, but
neither the stipulators nor their sureties could satisfy the judgment. An
in personam suit was filed against Raymond in April, 1881.
On the facts, the court found that since Raymond had disassociated
himself from the operations of the "Zodiac" prior to the time of the
collision, he could not be liable for damage caused by the vessel.
Additionally, however, the court found that the in personam libel, served
eight and a half years after the collision, was barred by laches. Citing
earlier authorities, the court recognized that there was no statute of
limitations in admiralty, but noted that admiralty courts usually apply
an appropriate state prescriptive period.14 Despite finding that the schoo-
ner owners had diligently pursued their in rem rights from the date of
the collision, the court reasoned that: "this has never been held to be
a ground for the extension of the statutory period of limitation in regard
to remedies in personam."25
The court's holding on laches demonstrated a strong commitment
to abide by the provisions of local limitations statutes, especially in in
23. 18 F. 547 (S.D. N.Y. 1883).
24. Id. at 553.
25. Id.
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personam cases. A later New York case, Southard v. Brady,26 followed
the Scull approach. In Southard, suit was filed more than six years
after the occurrence of the events giving rise to the dispute. 27 The district
court found that the suit was barred by laches. Appeal was taken to
the Circuit Court, and the decision of the district court was affirmed.
Mr. Justice Lacombe, rendering the opinion of the court, began by
emphasizing that:
"Statutes of limitations are no longer received in an unfavorable
light, as an unjust and discreditable defense. . . .They are now
generally regarded with favor, as being in the interest of justice,
by compelling parties to bring their actions promptly, so that
debtors shall not be obliged to take care forever of their ac-
quittances, or alleged debtors of the evidence which may enable
them to defeat the claims advanced against them." '2
The court then noted that although there are no prescriptive periods
in admiralty, federal courts will not enforce stale maritime causes. Re-
ferring to the holding of Justice Story in The Brig Sarah Ann, the court
stated: "Where there is nothing exceptional in the case, the court will
govern itself by the analogies of the common-law limitations. '29 The
court further observed that admiralty law allows for a finding of laches
even before the running of the analogous state statute of limitations,
if the circumstances are exceptional.
The Fifth Circuit took a more liberal approach to the question of
laches in The Alabama,0 which was an in rem claim for personal injuries.
The libelant was a stevedore, who, on attempting to descend into the
hold of the vessel, fell, and sustained injury because of the collapse of
certain protruding planks. The accident occurred in August, 1906. After
his release from the hospital in October, 1906, the libelant immediately
contacted an attorney. The latter soon discovered that the United Fruit
Company had owned or chartered the vessel at the time of the accident.
He promptly offered to settle the case, but United Fruit did not respond.
In anticipation of the vessel's return to New Orleans on November 13,
1906, the settlement offer was renewed, again without response.' The
vessel left New Orleans on November 14, 1906, without legal action
having been taken.
26. 36 F. 560 (Cir. Ct. N.Y. 1888).
27. The report does not specify the details of the substantive cause of action, but
narrates that the libelant owners had chartered the "T. Jeffrey Southard" to a respondent
charterer in late 1875. The vessel sailed from Galveston, Texas, for the continent of
Europe in March 1876. The charterer was served with the libel on October 23, 1883.
28. Southard, 36 F. 560.
29. Id. at 561.
30. 242 F. 431 (5th Cir. 1917).
31. Id. at 432.
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Thereafter, the "Alabama" did not return to New Orleans until
May 1911, and then only for two fleeting visits, one of which was not
published in the Times-Democrat (local New Orleans newspaper). The
"Alabama" next returned on December 16, 1913. The libelant com-
menced his in rem action a day later. The District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana held that laches barred the complaint. The Fifth
Circuit reversed.
The Court of Appeals found that libelant and his attorney had been
unaware of the visits of the "Alabama" to New Orleans in 1911 until
after the fact. Accordingly, the court held that: "There was no sub-
sequent opportunity [to seize the "Alabama"] until the ship was libelled
in 1913." ' a2 The substance of the claimants' laches argument was that
the long delay had resulted in the loss of vital witnesses. But the court
countered by observing:
A party with a cause of action against a ship should not be
penalized for undertaking to settle his claim amicably ...
Doubtless the necessary facts could have been easily ascertained,
and the necessary witnesses easily procured, at the time the
vessel received the letter stating the claim. A little regard at that
time for the rights of others, and a little courtesy to one rep-
resenting those rights, would probably have been profitable. 33
The court concluded that: "Libelant used all reasonable diligence in the
institution of the suit. . . ." 34
In The Alabama, the Fifth Circuit skated over some potential dif-
ficulties in the libelant's position. After the first offer of settlement had
met with no response, might it not have been much more prudent to
have simply seized the "Alabama" in November, 1906? Nor did the
court even allude to the question of whether the libelant could have
sued the shipowners or charterers in personam. On the other hand, it
is clear that the Fifth Circuit was outraged by the claimants' failure to
respond to the stevedore's repeated settlement offers. The issue of the
defendant's good faith can, therefore, play a powerful role in the laches
analysis.
The Fifth Circuit's "reasonable diligence" formulation seemed to
suggest that an admiralty plaintiff is not under an absolute duty to
promptly exhaust all possible opportunities for litigation. The court's
examination of the "Alabama's" visits to United States ports was limited,
after all, to the libelant's home port of New Orleans. A maritime lien
can, of course, be enforced in any district court of the United States,
assuming the availability of the appropriate vessel.
32. Id. at 433.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 436.
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From the inception of the Republic to the early nineteen twenties,
admiralty courts approached the question of laches from varying per-
spectives. Many authorities looked to analogous state prescriptive rules
as being dispositive absent "special" or "extreme" circumstances, es-
pecially in in personam cases. But occasionally, as in The Key City, or
The Alabama, the law seems to have been applied less rigidly. Overall,
however, courts adopted no really clear and definitive formulation.
I. The McGrath Era
Shortly after the end of the First World War, a passenger was
injured on a steamship while on a voyage from New York to Panama.
One year and forty days later, the passenger, one Anna McGrath, filed
suit against the steamship owner, the Panama Railroad Company. The
District Court of the Canal Zone dismissed McGrath v. Panama Railroad
Co.35 on the basis of laches. The case was appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
Until 1903, Panama had been part of Colombia. The Colombian
Civil Code, which continued to be the law of Panama in the post-
independence period, allowed a three year prescriptive period for personal
injury claims. The United States government, however, elected to suspend
the effect of the Colombian Civil Code in the Canal Zone. By virtue
of the Canal Zone Code of Civil Procedure, the applicable prescriptive
period for personal injury claims was one year. Both the district court
and the Fifth Circuit found that the analogous "state" prescriptive
period was that of the Canal Zone.3 6 Unfortunately, Anna McGrath's
attorney wrongly advised her that the three year Colombian period was
applicable. She failed to file suit within one year.
Affirming the decision of the district court, the Fifth Circuit noted
that although an admiralty court is not bound by prescriptive periods,
such limitations will be applied by analogy in the absence of equitable
reasons to the contrary. Very significantly, the court observed:
It would be inconsistent to permit him [a libelant] to sue in
admiralty, with the same effect as at common law (as is true
in the case of a libel in personam), after his [libelants'] right
to sue at common law had become barred. 37
The appellant attempted to argue that laches, after the passing of
the analogous state prescriptive period, is triggered by a finding of
unreasonable delay and prejudice to the defendant."' The reason for the
35. 298 F. 303 (5th Cir. 1924).
36. There is little that is distinctly maritime about the analysis courts use to determine
the analogous prescriptive period. See discussion in In Re Complaint of American Export
Lines, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 490, 514-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
37. McGrath, 298 F. at 304.
38. This deduction is made from review of the judgment's second to last paragraph.
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delay, being a classic error of law, was clearly inexcusable. The Fifth
Circuit, however, did not even consider whether the delay of forty days
could have prejudiced the defendant. Instead, prejudice was presumed:
"when equity adopts the statutory period, it adopts along with it the
presumption of injury, until the contrary is shown." 3 9
In McGrath, the Fifth Circuit was probably not going as far as
earlier courts, such as Scull, which essentially held that analogous statutes
of limitation should be applied mechanically in in personam cases.
Perhaps the court might have accepted convincing, or even "exceptional"
evidence of excusable delay and lack of prejudice. But nonetheless, the
McGrath decision reflected the fact that the Fifth Circuit of 1924 felt
distinctly uncomfortable about affording an in personam plaintiff greater
rights under admiralty than under ordinary federal jurisdiction.4
The restrictive approach of McGrath was to be persuasive in ad-
miralty courts until after the Second World War. 41 In The Mar Medi-
terraneo,42 for instance, holders of bills of lading sued for damage to
a cargo of sugar. The cargo had been transported from Germany in
39. Id.
40. A similar conservative approach was taken by the Second Circuit in Nolte v.
Hudson Navigation Co., 297 F. 758, 764 (2d Cir. 1924) ("But statutes of limitation are
no longer regarded with disfavor. On the contrary, they are regarded with favor as being
in the interest of justice. They are statutes of repose, and are enacted to compel parties
to commence actions promptly .... They are founded upon public policy; and while a
statute of limitations is not strictly a bar in admiralty, it has been thought that there is
no sufficient reason why it should not be followed in admiralty, as it is also in the courts
of equity." (authority omitted)).
41. However, the Fifth Circuit did not take a consistently narrow approach to laches
in the century's second quarter. In United States v. Alex Dussel Iron Works, Inc., 31
F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1929), for instance more liberal principles were articulated. In 1920,
the United States steamship "Sacandaga" was being loaded with sugar in New Orleans
for shipping to Bordeaux and Havre. A heated ingot was dropped into a hold of sugar,
the result being fire damage to both ship and cargo. Written demand was made in 1923,
and libel was filed by the United States, on behalf of itself and the cargo owners, in
1926. The district court dismissed the case because of laches.
The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, stating that the defense of laches can never
be urged against the United States. Id. at 537. Regarding the libelants' claim on behalf
of the cargo owners, however, the court held that all normal private law defenses could
be urged. The court doubted that laches could be made out on the facts alleged. The
court observed that:
Laches consists of two elements, inexcusable delay in instituting suit and prejudice
resulting to the defendant from such delay. Its existence depends upon the
equities of the case, and not merely upon the lapse of time. Id. at 536.
In Dussel, the reason for the delay had been that the United States could not find an
eyewitness to the accident until 1926. The Dussel court's characterization of laches as
consisting of two elements, inexcusable delay and prejudice, has been endlessly repeated,
and its observation that delay per se is not enough, actually represents in simplified form
the current law of laches, as applied in most appellate circuits.
42. 13 F. Supp. 860 (E.D. La. 1936).
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1920. Libel in rem was brought in 1926, after many opportunities for
seizure had passed. The facts presented a classic case of laches, with
witnesses having disappeared and other. critical evidence having been
lost. 3 The Mar Mediterraneo court did not decide which of two possible
analogous state prescriptive deadlines were applicable, since both were
long passed. The court rather stated:
Though not strictly a bar in admiralty, there does not seem to
be sufficient reason why the appropriate statute of limitations
should not be followed by analogy in this court as in equity,
especially where, as here, there are no exceptional circumstances
that would render the running of the statute of limitations
inequitable."
Thus, the court in The Mar Mediterraneo, like so many other admiralty
tribunals, restated the central principle of McGrath, viz, that the ap-
propriate analogous state statute of limitations should be applied in
admiralty, absent "exceptional circumstances. ' '45
IIL The Development of the Modern Doctrine
Ironically, the McGrath era ended with a case involving the same
defendant, the Panama Railroad Company, and somewhat similar facts.
In Gardner v. Panama Railroad Co. ,4 petitioner brought an in personam
action for personal injuries sustained while sailing, as a passenger, aboard
the "Panama," a steamship owned and operated by the defendant. The
injury occurred on December 3, 1947. At that time all of the defendant's
stock was owned by the United States government. Petitioner filed suit
in April, 1948, but her case was dismissed on grounds that her exclusive
remedy was to sue the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims
Act ("FTCA"). Shortly, thereafter, in November, 1948, she sued the
United States under the FTCA. In the summer of 1949, however, Con-
gress amended the FTCA to specifically exclude all claims against the
Panama Railroad Company. Therefore, this second action was also
dismissed. Finally, petitioner refiled suit against the Panama Railroad
Company in the district court for the Canal Zone on October 19, 1949.
As in McGrath, the analogous Canal Zone statute of limitations for
43. Id. at 862.
44. Id. at 863.
45. Other examples of courts applying the McGrath principles include, but are not
limited to: Kane v. U.S.S.R., 189 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1951); Redman v. United States,
176 F.2d 713, 715 (2d. Cir. 1949); Westfall Larson & Co. v. Man Hubble Tug Boat Co.,
73 F.2d 200, 203 (9th Cir. 1934); Marshall v. Int'l Mercantile Marine Co., 39 F.2d 551,
552 (2d Cir. 1930); Pope v. McGrady Rodgers Co., 70 F. Supp. 780, 781 (W.D. Pa.
1947); "The Kermit," 6 F. Supp. 113 (S.D. Cal. 1934).
46. 185 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1950).
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personal injuries was one year. Nearly two years had elapsed since the
accident.
The defendant successfully pled laches in the district court. The
district court's decision expressly relied on McGrath. In a brief opinion,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 47 The Supreme Court reversed, stating:
Though the existence of laches is a question primarily addressed
to the discretion of the trial court, the matter should not be
determined merely by reference to and a mechanical application
of the statute of limitations. The equities of the parties must
be considered as well. Where there has been no inexcusable delay
in seeking a remedy and where no prejudice to the defendant
has ensued from the mere passage of time, there should be no
bar to relief. 48
The Supreme Court went on to note the petitioner's transparent
diligence, and observed that: "There is no showing that respondent's
position has suffered from the fact that the claim has not yet proceeded
to trial on its merits." ' 49 The impact of Gardner was significant. The
Supreme Court emphasized that the admiralty doctrine of laches is truly
based on equity. By implication, the "exceptional circumstances" test
of McGrath was disapproved of, as being in practice "a mechanical
application of the statute of limitations."10 This is not to say that
Gardner overruled, or even explicitly criticized McGrath. In fact, the
Gardner Court even cited McGrath in support of its decision.' But now
the emphasis had changed: "mechanical application[s]" were out, and
the "equities of the parties" had to be considered. 2 Analogous pre-
scriptive periods were now to serve only in the allocation of the burden
of proof.
Gardner, however, left open one major question: does the plaintiff,
after the analogous prescriptive period passes, bear a conjunctive burden,
i.e., of proving lack of inexcusable delay and no prejudice, or a dis-
junctive burden, i.e., of proving lack of inexcusable delay or no prej-
udice? And, in broader terms, what is the relationship between the two
47. Id.
48. 342 U.S. 29, 30-31, 72 S. Ct. 12, 13 (1951).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. However, subsequent authorities have noted that the Gardner decision effec-
tuated a real change from the strict "exceptional circumstances" test of McGrath. See,
e.g., Larios v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 316 F.2d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1963) (highlighting
"erroneous reasoning" of McGrath).
52. Id.
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elements of laches?53 These issues have never been satisfactorily resolved
by the Supreme Court, but some guidance was given in Gutierrez v.
Waterman Steamship Corp.5 4 In that case, a Puerto Rican longshoreman,
while unloading the S.S. "Hastings" in the Port of Ponce, slipped on
spilled beans lying on the dock and thereby suffered injury. The plaintiff
filed suit some time after the running of the analogous one-year Puerto
Rican prescriptive period. However, the relevant records and eye-wit-
nesses were all available. The defendant's laches defense was rejected,
and plaintiff proceeded successfully to trial.
On appeal, the First Circuit reversed, holding, inter alia, that the
laches defense was sound. The defendant had been prejudiced, the
appellate court held, because the "availability to respondent of the
witnesses when the libel was filed was not as advantageous to it as
would have been an opportunity to examine them at an earlier date.""
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court as to all matters, in-
cluding laches.
The Gutierrez Court expressed an unwillingness to interfere with
what it saw as being the district court's credibility assessment: "The
trial court which heard the witnesses was the proper judge of which
evidence was credible; that [defendant's] records differ from [plaintiff's]
testimony here does not mean that respondent was prejudiced .... -56
More generally, the Court held:
The test of laches is prejudice to the other party. [authority
omitted]; Cities Service Oil Co. v. Puerto Rico Lighterage Co.,
305 F.2d 170, 171 (C.A. 1st Cir.) (both unreasonable delay and
consequent prejudice).5 7
This language would seem to indicate that prejudice is always nec-
essary for a finding of laches. The logical consequence is the adoption
of a type of disjunctive approach, i.e., if the plaintiff can negate
prejudice, that is sufficient to rule out laches. This conclusion would
seem especially sound given the Court's reliance on Cities Service Oil
Co. v. Puerto Rico Lighterage Co.,"' a clearly disjunctive authority. The
53. The issue of admiralty laches has come before the Supreme Court twice since
Gardner. In Czaplicki v. The S.S. Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 534, 76 S. Ct. 946 (1956),
for instance, the Court, finding lack of proof on both delay and prejudice, reversed a
Second Circuit decision affirming a district court's dismissal of suit based on laches. The
Czaplicki Court reaffirmed the equitable nature of laches and the non-mechanical appli-
cation of analogous prescriptive periods, but there was no attempt to clarify the burden
issue left open by Gardner.
54. 373 U.S. 206, 83 S. Ct. 1185 (1963).
55. Id. at 208, 83 S. Ct. at 1187 (paraphrasing reasoning of appellate court).
56. Id. at 216, 83 S. Ct. at 1191.
57. Id. at 215, 83 S. Ct. at 1191 (emphasis added).
58. 305 F.2d 170, 171 (ist Cir. 1962).
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Gutierrez holding, however, does not make clear what should happen
when a burdened plaintiff is able to prove excusable delay but not lack
of prejudice. 9 In any event, most federal appellate courts, in the wake
of Gardner and Gutierrez, adopted disjunctive rules. This is now clearly
true of the First,60 Fourth, 61 Fifth,6 Eighth, 6  Ninth,6 and Eleventh65
Circuits. The same is probably true of the Seventh Circuit. 66 The nature
of the doctrine in the Tenth Circuit has not been clearly determined.
67
59. It might be noted, however, that courts have not read Gutierrez to require a
finding of laches in such circumstances. See, e.g., Sandvik v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 609
F.2d 969, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Gutierrez, but noting that: "Even the presence
of prejudice does not necessarily require dismissal.").
60. See, e.g., Edelmann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 861 F.2d 1291, 1293 n.9
(1st Circuit 1988) (non-admiralty case); Puerto Rican-American Ins. v. Benjamin Shipping,
829 F.2d 281, 283-85 (Ist Cir. 1987); Cities Serv., 305 F.2d at 171 ("A suit in admiralty
is barred by laches only when there has been both unreasonable delay in the filing of
the libel and consequent prejudice to the party against whom suit is brought."-reversing
a district court finding laches where delay was unexcused but plaintiff had shown lack
of prejudice).
61. Riddick v. Baltimore Steam Packet Co., 374 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1967); Giddens
v. Isbrandtsen Co., 355 F.2d 125, 128 (4th Cir. 1966) (ruling that under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 8(c), the burden of proving laches, as an affirmative defense, is on the
defendant, but also noting that the passing of the analogous prescriptive period creates
presumptions of inexcusability and prejudice-"However, even if the delay be beyond the
preceptive statutory period, or appear inordinate on other considerations, and although
it be explained only insubstantially or not at all, the defendant is not relieved of his
burden of proving prejudice. But he may either rest on the inference alone or introduce
additional evidence." (emphasis added)).
62. See discussion infra text accompanying note 75.
63. Azalea Fleet v. Dreyfus Supply & Mach. Corp., 782 F.2d 1455, 1458 (8th Cir.
1986); Cotton v. Mabry, 674 F.2d 701, 704 (8th Cir. 1982) (non-admiralty case); Goodman
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 804 (8th Cir. 1979) ("For the application
of the doctrine of laches to bar a lawsuit, the plaintiff must be guilty of unreasonable
and inexcusable delay that has resulted in prejudice to the defendant.").
64. Stevens Technical Servs., Inc. v. S.S. Brooklyn, 885 F.2d 584. 588 (9th Cir.
1989) ("Laches requires the presence of both inexcusable delay and prejudice"); Sandvik
v. Alaska Packers Ass'n., 609 F.2d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Even the presence of
prejudice does not necessarily require dismissal. It may be outweighed by the strength of
the excuse for the delay"); Espino v. Ocean Cargo Line, Ltd., 382 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir.
1967).
65. The Eleventh Circuit covers Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. These states were
part of the old, pre-1981 Fifth Circuit, which included Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louis-
iana, Mississippi, and Texas. The Eleventh Circuit is bound by the rulings of the old
Fifth Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (ilth Cir. 1981).
See also Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1517 (11th Cir. 1984) (laches requires
proof of both delay and prejudice).
66. See de Furgalski v. Siegel, 618 F. Supp. 295, 300 (N.D. 111. 1985).
67. See Rea v. An-San Corp., 79 F.R.D. 25, 28-29 (W.D. OkI. 1978) (due to small
number of admiralty cases in Tenth Circuit, law of laches is undeveloped-court rejecting
defense of laches, finding excusable delay and lack of prejudice.).
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The Fifth Circuit, with its large volume of admiralty cases, has been
the leading "disjunctive circuit." Possibly the best Fifth Circuit discus-
sion of laches can be found in Akers v. State Marine Lines, Inc. s
Briefly, the facts of the case were as follows: plaintiff suffered an
alleged injury on April 17, 1960, and filed suit against his employer in
a Texas court. The plaintiff, however, proceeded to dismiss this suit,
because, subsequently, he became wrongly convinced that he could not
sue his employer. A few years later, the plaintiff learned of the Supreme
Court's decision in Reed v. Steamship Yaka,69 which led him to believe
that he could, after all, sue his employer. Therefore, he brought the
instant suit, which was promptly dismissed by the district court on
grounds of laches.
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by agreeing with the district
court that the appropriate analogous state prescriptive period was three
years, which had lapsed.7 0 Therefore, the burden of proof was allocated
to the plaintiff. Since the reason for the delay had been an error of
law, the court held that the delay was inexcusable. 7' But the court's
inquiry did not end there:
A suit in admiralty is barred by laches only when there has
been both unreasonable delay in the filing of the libel and
consequent prejudice to the party against whom suit is brought.
As we have repeatedly emphasized,
"Laches is much more than time. It is time plus prej-
udicial harm, and the harm is not merely that one loses
what he otherwise would have kept, but that delay has
subjected him to a disadvantage in asserting and estab-
lishing his claimed right or defense." 72
If it can be shown that respondents have suffered no prejudice
from the delay, then the unexcused delay alone is not sufficient
to cause the libel to be dismissed.73
Thus, under Akers, a burdened plaintiff must show either lack of
inexcusable delay or lack of prejudice. On the facts, the court found
that there existed genuine issues of material fact relative to whether the
defendant had been prejudiced by the delay. Accordingly, the case was
remanded so that both parties could be afforded full opportunity to
68. 344 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1965).
69. 373 U.S. 410, 83 S. Ct. 1349 (1963).
70. Akers, 344 F.2d at 220.
71. Id.
72. Citing Point Landing Inc. v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 261 F.2d
861, 865 (5th Cir. 1958) (per Judge John Brown). This language is amongst the most
frequently quoted laches holdings.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
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offer whatever evidence was available, on the question of prejudice. 4
Numerous Fifth Circuit cases have reiterated the disjunctive principles
of Akers."
The position of the Third Circuit, on the other hand, appears to
be that the plaintiff, after the passing of the analogous prescriptive
period, bears a conjunctive burden. In Burke v. Gateway Clipper, Inc.,76
the plaintiff alleged that he had suffered various injuries while working
aboard a ship on the Ohio River. The accident happened on June 18,
1958, but the complaint, asserting violations of the Jones Act and the
unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure doctrines, was filed over ten
years later, in December, 1968. The Jones Act claim was, of course,
subject to the statutory prescriptive period of three years, and the same
period was held to be the analogous prescriptive period for the other
two claims. These were dismissed on grounds of laches.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, and remanded for further
consideration of laches. Referring to the burden allocation rule of Gard-
ner, the Third Circuit held:
This Circuit requires the plaintiff to come forward and prove
that his delay was excusable and that it did not unduly prejudice
the defendant. [authorities omitted]
We are aware that other circuits place the burden of proving
inexcusable delay and prejudice on the defendant. We see no
new and compelling reason to reverse the well-established and
thoroughly considered line of decisions of this Circuit requiring
the plaintiff to disprove both inexcusable delay and lack of
74. Id. at 221.
75. See, e.g., West Wind Africa Line Ltd. v. Corpus Christi Marine Servs. Co., 834
F.2d 1232, 1234 (5th Cir. 1988) (defendants' burden is conjunctive); Albertson v. T.J.
Stevenson & Co., Inc., 749 F.2d 223, 233 (5th Cir. 1984); Pizani v. M/V Cotton Blossom,
669 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1982); Mecom v. Levingston Shipbuilding Co., 622 F.2d
1209, 1215 (5th Cir. 1980); Barrios v. Nelda Faye Inc., 597 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1979)
(defendants' burden is conjunctive); Watz v. Zapata Off-shore Co., 431 F.2d 100, 112
(5th Cir. 1970); Esso Int'l Inc. v. S.S. Captain John, 443 F.2d 1144, 1150 (5th Cir.
1971); Crews v. Arundel Corp., 386 F.2d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 1967); Molnar v. Gulfcoast
Transit Co., 371 F.2d 639, 642 (5th Cir. 1967); Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. C/
B Mr. Kim, 345 F.2d 45, 50 (5th Cir. 1960); Dow Chem. Co. v. Barge UM-23B, 424
F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1969); Byrd v. The M/V Yozgat, 420 F.2d 954, 955 (5th Cir.
1970); Phillips v. Springfield Ins. Co., 418 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1969); In Re Casco Chem.
Co., 335 F.2d 645, 651 (5th Cir. 1964); McConville v. Florida Towing Corp., 321 F.2d
162, 168 (5th Cir. 1963); Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F.2d 60, 70 (5th Cir. 1961); Point
Landing Inc. v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 261 F.2d 861, 865 (5th Cir.
1958); McDaniel v. Gulf & South Am. Steamship Co., 228 F.2d 189, 192 (5th Cir. 1955).
76. 441 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1971).
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prejudice to the defendant when, as here, more than three years
have passed since the cause of action accrued.7"
Thus, in the Third Circuit, after the passing of the analogous
prescriptive period, laches consists of inexcusable delay or prejudice. 71
In the authors' view, a conjunctive approach is inconsistent with the
Supreme Court's ruling in Gutierrez that "the test of laches is prejudice
to the other party," at least in those instances where the plaintiff has
no excuse for delay but there has been no prejudice.7 9 At least one
district court in the Sixth Circuit appears to favor a conjunctive approach
to laches in admiralty. 0
The Second Circuit has opted for a third, and ultimately more
confusing, alternative, namely, that the elements of laches are legally
interrelated. The genesis of the Second Circuit's approach is found in
Larios v. Victory Carriers, Inc."t In Larios, a seaman was injured in a
collision off the coast of Europe between the S.S. "loannis" and the
S.S. "Stony Point." Larios had been a hand on the S.S. "loannis."
The collision took place on June 18, 1957. Larios spent six months
recovering in France and Germany, during which time he was assured
by representatives of the S.S. "loannis" that his injuries would shortly
disappear. He returned to work on the S.S. "loannis," until he finally
left her in Texas, in December, 1958. He thereafter stayed in the United
States for six months, when he again left for Germany. He returned
to the United States on September 12, 1960, having successfully obtained
permanent residency. 2 A little over a week later, he filed suit against
the owners and other joint controllers of the S.S. "loannis" and the
S.S. "Stony Point." The analogous state prescriptive period was New
York's three-year statute of limitations for personal injuries. 3
Two of the defendants, Victory Carriers, Inc. and the Alexander S.
Onassis Corp., filed motions for summary judgment on grounds of
77. Id. at 949-50 (emphasis added).
78. See also EEOC v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 735 F.2d 69, 80 (3d Cir. 1984)
("In that case, [when the analogous prescriptive period has passed] the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to justify its delay and negate prejudice." (emphasis added)); Pierre v. Hess
Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 624 F.2d 445, 450 (3d Cir. 1980); Gruca v. United States Steel
Corp., 495 F.2d 1252, 1260 (3d Cir. 1974); Mooz v. Dravo Corp., 429 F.2d 1156, 1160
(3d Cir. 1970); Lipfird v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line, 310 F.2d 639, 642 (3d Cir. 1962).
But see Claussen v. Mene Grande Oil Co., C.A., 275 F.2d 108, 111-13 (3d Cir. 1960)
(apparently applying the disjunctive rule).
79. See supra discussion of Gutierrez at note 59.
80. Keller v. Standard Sand and Gravel Co., 365 F. Supp. I (S.D. Ohio 1973). But
see TWM MFG. Co., Inc. v. Dura Corp., 722 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1983) (applying
a disjunctive approach in context of patent law).
81. 316 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1963).
82. Id. at 67.
83. Id. at 65.
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laches. The district court simply noted that the three-year period had
run and dismissed the case. Noting the Gardner holding, the Second
Circuit found that the passing of the analogous prescriptive period merely
serves to allocate the burden of proof." The court then went on to
hold that the "presumption of prejudice" associated with the lapsing
of the analogous prescriptive period, means only: "that if the plaintiff
proffers no pleading or presents no proof on the issue of laches, the
defendant wins." 85
Interestingly, the Larios court placed a lot of importance on the
element of delay. The court held that, after the passing of the analogous
prescriptive period, the plaintiff must prove lack of inexcusable delay,
while the defendant has the obligation to show prejudice. 86
The Larios court further explained that the two elements of laches
are not independent: "A weak excuse may suffice if there has been no
prejudice; an exceedingly good one might still do even when there has
been some."8 a7 This language seems to imply that, depending on the
circumstances, the plaintiff's burden could be conjunctive (weak excuse/
no prejudice) or disjunctive (strong excuse/prejudice). This conclusion
is supported by the court's interpretation of the seemingly conjunctive
language in Gardner:88 But saying that a plaintiff who has fully cleared
each of two hurdles will win is not the same as saying that a plaintiff
must fully clear each of two hurdles to win. 9
Very significantly, the court concluded its recitation of legal principle
by observing: Even on this [legally interrelated] approach there may be
cases where the plaintiff's evidence as to excuse for the delay is so
insubstantial that the court need not call on the defendant to come
forward with evidence of prejudice. 90
The logical inference from this language is that a plaintiff who has
no excuse for his or her delay loses on laches if the analogous prescriptive
period has passed. On the other hand, the plaintiff with a strong excuse
will prevail, despite a showing of prejudice. On the facts, the court
found that the plaintiff's excuse for the delay was at least worth com-
84. Id. at 66. ("When the suit has been brought after the expiration of the state
limitation period, a court applying maritime law asks why the case should be allowed to
proceed; when the suit, although perhaps long delayed, has nevertheless been brought
within the state limitation period, the court asks why it should not be.").
85. Id.
86. Id. However, the court subsequently asserted that the "ultimate burden" is still
on the plaintiff as to both delay and prejudice. Id. at 67.
87. Id. at 67.
88. Gardner v. Panama R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 29, 31, 72 S. Ct. 12, 13 (1951) ("Where
there has been no unexcusable delay in seeking a remedy and where no prejudice to the
defendant has ensued from the mere passage of time, there should be no bar to relief.").
89. Larios v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 316 F.2d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 1963).
90. Id.
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paring to any evidence of prejudice which the defendants might be able
to produce, and the case was remanded for this purpose.9'
IV. Some Recent Cases
In 1980, Congress enacted 46 U.S.C. § 763(a), which provides a
fixed prescriptive period of three years for all personal injuries (including
death) in admiralty. Thus, the admiralty doctrine of laches has now a
more circumscribed, commercial scope, applying mainly in cases of
tortious property damage and contract.
This last historical part looks at how courts have applied the now
less applicable doctrine in recent times. The emphasis has recently been
placed on the element of prejudice. And it seems as if courts are now,
in general, giving closer scrutiny to laches defenses. Two particularly
important cases are chosen for review.
In Azalea Fleet v. Dreyfus Supply & Machinery Corp. ,92 the dispute
arose from a barge breakaway on the Mississippi River. The plaintiff,
Azalea, had installed a defective timberhead on the barge which gave
in under the application of normal pressure. This particular accident,
along with other contributing factors, caused a series of collisions, leading
to a massive and complex litigation. In July, 1981, the owner of the
barge, Consolidated Grain & Barge Company, made demand for in-
demnity against Azalea. Azalea rejected this request, but the demands
continued.
91. While Larios still appears to be good law in the Second Circuit, subsequent
decisions have served to muddy the waters. About ten years later, in Hill v. W. Bruns
& Co., 498 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1974), the Second Circuit reversed a finding of laches in
the district court, emphasizing the importance of prejudice: "Laches is a doctrine aimed
at avoiding the commencement of stale claims in equity where it is impossible or difficult
for a defendant to defend because evidence has been destroyed or lost and the defendant
[is] thereby prejudiced as a result of the delay in the institution of the action." Hill, 498
F.2d at 568.
However, a subsequent panel, in Public Adm'r of the County of N.Y. v. Angela
Compania Naviera S.A., 592 F.2d 58, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1979), seemed to take a third
approach, vaguely focusing on both delay and prejudice. Later courts have had more
direct recourse to Larios-see Dickey v. Alcoa Steamship Co., Inc., 641 F.2d 81, 82 (2d
Cir. 198)-or taken the more evenhanded approach of Public Adm'r. See DeSilvio v.
Prudential Lines, Inc., 701 F.2d 13, 15 (2d Cir. 1983). While district courts in the Second
Circuit appear to believe that Larios is still the law, some have confessed to a certain
degree of confusion. See, e.g., LaGares v. Good Commander Shipping Co., 487 F. Supp.
1243, 1244 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); De Monte v. Shipping Corp. of India, Ltd., 476 F. Supp.
392, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("under Larios this action would be barred automatically [because
of the inexcusable nature of the delay]; under Hill we must focus on prejudice; under
Public Adm'r both factors must be considered in general, but it is unclear whether the
Larios rule still operates to bar the action where the [analogous] statute [of limitations]
has run and the plaintiff has offered no excuse for the delay.").
92. 782 F.2d 1455 (8th Cir. 1986).
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Finally, on May 27, 1982, Consolidated was cast in judgment for
a portion of the total damage, and very shortly thereafter, on June 3,
Consolidated filed a third party demand for indemnity against Azalea.
On June 22, Azalea notified Dreyfus, which had supplied the timberhead,
that the federal court for the Eastern District of Missouri had found
Consolidated liable because of its defective timberhead, that Azalea had
installed the timberhead, and that Dreyfus had supplied it. Demand for
indemnity was made, with suit being filed a little later, on July 28, of
the same year.
Was the plaintiff's indemnity claim barred by laches? Azalea did
not inform Dreyfus of its indemnity claim until eleven months after
Consolidated's first demand for indemnity. This, according to defendant,
constituted failure to comply with the "timely notice" requirement of
the Uniform Commercial Code.93 Additionally, the defendant argued
that the plaintiff had absolutely no excuse for the delay. The defendant
further argued that it had suffered the following prejudice: loss of the
opportunity to take part in the settlement negotiations between other
parties involved in the dispute and inability to take part in the pretrial
discovery and to cross-examine an important witness who testified as
to causation of the barge collision. Lastly, the defendant pointed to the
fact that the timberhead baseplate, which would have identified the
manufacturer, was no longer available.Y
Despite these reasonable arguments, the district court granted sum-
mary judgment for the plaintiff, and the court of appeals affirmed. The
court held that Azalea was not guilty of "inequitable .or bad conduct,
• . . or unreasonable delay" since it gave notice to Dreyfus as soon as
it knew that the defendant had supplied the timberhead. 9 The court of
appeals also pointed out that the cases relied upon by the defendant to
show that an eleven month delay was unreasonable as a matter of law,
did not apply to the case at bar since those cases involved breach of
warranty claims rather than laches.9
On the other hand, the court held that the defendant was not
substantially prejudiced by the delay. After reviewing the defendant's
prejudice arguments, the court found that the defendant was not prej-
udiced by the delay, because it probably would not have settled the
claim earlier in any event. Nor was the defendant prejudiced by the
loss of opportunity to take part in the discovery process. It could have
initiated its own discovery, since it was a party to the suit for over one
93. Id. at 1459.
94. Id.
95. Vollmar Bros. Constr. v. Archway Fleeting & Harbor Service, Inc., 596 F. Supp.
112, 118 (E.D. Mos. 1984).
96. Azalea Fleet, 782 F.2d at 1459 n.4.
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and a half years before trial. The court also noted that the loss of the
timberhead baseplate was not caused by the plaintiff's delay. Instead it
was due to the actions of the barge owner, and was, in fact, unavailable
to the plaintiff itself.9
7
In conclusion, since neither unreasonable delay nor substantial prej-
udice were proved, the defense of laches was rejected. It is of interest
to note that the burden of proof fell upon the defendant. In this respect,
the court stated:
Because the case was decided on strict liability principles, the
applicable statute of limitations was five years, running from
the date the cause of action accrued . . . [authorities omitted].
Therefore Azalea brought its claim within the statutory period
and Dreyfus bears the burden of proving laches. 98
One's overall impression, from conducting a careful review of the Azalea
Fleet court's holding, is that the defendants' claim of prejudice was
subjected to exacting scrutiny.
Another recent case, Ali A. Tamini v. M/V Jewon, focuses on the
same issue of prejudice.9 In Ali A. Tamini, the plaintiff owned a rotary
drill rig, which was loaded onto the M/V Jewon while she was docked
in Houston, Texas. Shortly afterwards, a loading stevedore negligently
dropped a heavy piece of equipment onto the rig. This happened on
October 30, 1981. At the time of the accident, the vessel was under
subcharter to Salen Dry Cargo AB, which had intended to ship the rig
to the plaintiff in Saudi Arabia. After settlement talks failed, Tamini
filed suit against Salen in New York on December 3, 1983. However,
no defendants were actually served at that time. Instead, proceedings
were stayed pending an arbitration, which began on July 19, 1984 and
concluded a year later with an award in favor of Tamini for $111,884.54
plus interest. Salen, however, had previously filed bankruptcy. Tamini
thereafter elected to pursue his in rem rights against the M/V Jewon.
He located her in Port Elizabeth, South Africa, and threatened to seize
her. In response, the owner's Protection and Indemnity Association
agreed to issue a letter of undertaking whereby it obligated itself to
defend the vessel in New York and satisfy a judgment up to $130,000.00.
The defendant moved for summary judgment, on grounds, inter
alia, that the action was time-barred by laches. The district court dis-
missed the in rem complaint for lack of diligent prosecution.1°° The
district court concluded that the defendant was "sufficiently prejudiced"
97. Id. at 1460.
98. Id. at 1459.
99. 808 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1987).
100. Technically, the dismissal was based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b),
but the reasoning was based on laches. Ali A. Tamini, 808 F.2d at 980.
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by the "moderate" delay in bringing the in rem action to warrant
dismissal on the merits.' 0' The plaintiff appealed, and the Second Circuit
vacated and remanded.
The court of appeals based its decision on the prejudice issue. The
district court's finding of prejudice, based on the assumption that the
arbitration award was binding on the defendant, was rejected. Instead,
the court pointed out that the defendants were not prejudiced by their
lack of participation in the earlier arbitration proceedings. This was
because "[tihey were not parties to either the arbitration agreement or
the arbitration proceedings and were not bound by the award."' 1 Fur-
thermore, there was no showing that the defendants' failure to participate
in the arbitration prejudiced them in their claim-over against Salen,
because the arbitration award was issued after the subcharterer's filing
of bankruptcy. Nor was there any showing that an earlier seizure of
the M/V Jewon would have made the defendants' claim-over possible
before bankruptcy. Furthermore, the court held, it was not clear that
"a pre-bankruptcy judgment against Salen would have been collectible
in whole or in part."' 13
Finally, the court observed that both parties agreed that the ultimate
responsibility for the damage to the rig rested with the loading stevedore.
Therefore, the real laches issue was whether the defendant's rights against
the stevedoring company had been prejudiced. The district court had
not addressed this matter.
Finally, the court of appeals cautioned that "dismissal of an action
with prejudice is a drastic remedy which should be applied only in
extreme circumstances,"' 14 and concluded that "the district court's drastic
remedy of dismissal on the merits is without adequate factual and legal
support." 0  Like the Azalea Fleet case, the Al A. Tamini decision
serves to underscore the radical importance of prejudice in the modern
doctrine of laches.
V. A Synopsis of the Doctrine
The maritime doctrine of laches supplies the rule of prescription for
the many admiralty causes of action which have no statutorily fixed
prescriptive period. Laches is an ancient equitable doctrine, and is within
the sound discretion of the district court.' 6 The first issue to be de-
101. Id. at 980.
102. Id. at 981.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 980.
105. Id. at 982.
106. Akers v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 344 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1965); Gardner v.
Panama R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 29, 72 S. Ct. 12 (1951).
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termined is the identity of the analogous state or federal prescriptive
period. The answer is arrived at by the application of normal rules of
statutory construction and interpretation. A good rule of thumb is to
consider what limitations period would apply "to a comparable non-
admiralty action filed in state court in the state in which the cause of
action arose." '07
After the issue of the appropriate analogous prescriptive period has
been resolved, the burden of proof is allocated to either the plaintiff
(if the analogous period has passed), or to the defendant (if it has
not). 0s In the event that the plaintiff has the burden of proof, he is
(in most circuits) required to prove either: (1) that his delay in filing
suit was not unreasonable; or (2) that the defendant has suffered no
prejudice from the delay. However, the Second and Third Circuits appear
to have different rules, and the rule in some other circuits is not clear.
But if the analogous prescriptive period has not passed, the defendant
bears the burden to prove both: (1) that the delay was unreasonable;
and (2) that he was prejudiced thereby.,09 Laches, then, partakes of two
elements: delay and prejudice.
Of those two elements, prejudice is by far the most important."10
Modern courts are inclined to review a defendant's prejudice claims very
carefully, even in cases where the burden is on the plaintiff. It will
never be enough for a defendant to assert, simpliciter, that the suit, if
not barred, will expose him to the possibility of losing what he might
otherwise have kept."' The most typical cases of prejudice are where
the defendant has: lost access to witnesses or documents critical to his
defense, or where it has otherwise become impossible to review and
analyze the situation in controversy;" 2 lost the right to contribution or
indemnity;" 3 lost the right to pass on costs to its customers;" 4 or lost
the right to participate in prior discovery, prior arbitration proceedings,
or settlement negotiations." 5 Courts, however, will review allegations
such as these through the prism of causation. Mere loss of the right
to participate in arbitration or settlement negotiations, for example, is
not enough. The critical question is whether the defendant would have
107. Sandvik v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 609 F.2d 969, 971 (9th Cir. 1979).
108. Gardner v. Panama R. Co., 342 U.S. 29, 31, 72 S. Ct. 12, 13 (1951).
109. Barrios v. Nelda Faye, Inc., 597 F.2d 881 (5th Cir. 1979).
110. Sandvik, 609 F.2d at 972; Ali A. Tamini v. M/V Jewon, 808 F.2d 978 (2d Cir.
1987).
111. Point Landing, Inc. v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 261 F.2d 861,
865 (5th Cir. 1958). .
112. Delgado v. The Malula, 291 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1961).
113. Stevens Technical Servs., Inc. v. S.S. Brooklyn, 885 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1989).
114. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc. v. El Verde Poultry Farms, Inc., 590 F.
Supp. 1174 (D.P.R. 1984).
115. Azalea Fleet v. Dreyfus Supply & Mach. Corp., 782 F.2d 1455 (8th Cir. 1986).
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prevailed in the arbitration, or entered into a settlement. 1 6 And the loss
of a right to assert a contribution or indemnity claim must constitute
the loss of a viable economic right. For example, the loss of a right
to sue a previously bankrupt corporation will not amount to prejudice." 7
And time and again, courts have focused on the notice issue. When
was the defendant first appraised of the possibility of plaintiff's bringing
his claim? Early and effective notice, negating prejudice, has defeated
numerous laches defenses."'
It may well be that, in the nature of things, tort defendants find
it easier to win on laches than do other defendants. Tort claims, perhaps,
rely more on eyewitnesses and particular situation analyses." 9 The passage
of time is more likely to prejudice defendants' abilities to mount effective
defenses in such cases. 20 On the other hand, indeed, courts are unlikely
to find prejudice in cases where a more or less intact set of documents
constitutes the essence of the proof. 2 ' But even the loss of witnesses
or documents will not amount to prejudice per se. Pertinent issues will
be, when were the witnesses or documents lost, and how relevant or
effective could they have been?2 2 If the witnesses and documents dis-
appeared the day after the accident, the prejudice was not caused by
the delay.
116. Id.
117. Stevens Technical Servs., Inc. v. S.S. Brooklyn, 885 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1989).
118. See, e.g., West Wind Africa Line Ltd. v. Corpus Christi Marine Services Co.,
834 F.2d 1232, 1234 (5th Cir. 1988); Claussen v. Mene Grande Oil Co., C.A., 275 F.2d
108, 113 (3d Cir. 1960); Rea v. An-Sar Corp., 79 F.R.D. 25, 29 (W.D. OkI. 1978).
119. Puerto Rican-American Ins. Co. v. Benjamin Shipping Co., 829 F.2d 281, 284
(Ist Cir. 1987) (witnesses and records lost-finding of laches); Albertson v. T.J. Stevenson
& Co., Inc., 749 F.2d 223, 233 (5th Cir. 1984) (it was established that "Stevenson had
a uniform policy of retaining records, logs, and other reports of a particular voyage for
a period of only ten years, and that all such [relevant] records, reports and logs . . . had
been destroyed approximately three years before Albertson initiated this suit.").
120. Delgado v. The Malula, 291 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1961) ("In these circumstances,
it was certainly within the considered discretion of the District Court to conclude on
equitable principles that this cause came too late and on the trial the respondent would
be without defenses, evidence of defenses, or any reasonable means of obtaining evidence
of defenses.").
121. Loverich v. Warner Co., 118 F.2d 690, 693 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S.
577, 61 S. Ct. 1104 (1941) (thirteen year delay caused no prejudice because medical
records, which were the only relevant evidence, were available).
122. Vega v. The Malula, 291 F.2d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1961) ("On the surface the
respondent made a plausible showing of prejudice. Years had gone by. The vessel was
sunk and the equipment in question was long since lost. Finally, a seaman who was
responsible for maintenance of this cargo gear was no longer living. The trouble was that
this did not make any difference. The respondent through his responsible representatives
knew not only of the occurrence but knew as well that it was a patent case of unsea-
worthiness as to which it had no defense on liability.").
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The element of unreasonable delay is more difficult to assess. One
thing that is certain, however, is that once the analogous prescriptive
period has passed, failure to file suit because of ignorance of the law
will always be found unreasonable. This position is fully consistent with
the legal maxim: ignorantia leges neminem excusat. 23 On the other hand,
justifiable ignorance of fact will excuse delay.' Findings of unreasonable
delay are likely to arise from the indolence of the plaintiff, and, in this
connection, courts sometimes find that the delay element is related to
prejudice. This is especially likely to be the case in those relatively rare
instances where the defendant has to carry the burden of proof. Where
the analogous prescriptive period has not passed, there almost has to
be an element of culpability in the delay. Where Congress or state
legislatures change the analogous prescriptive periods, or otherwise change
applicable law, this will likely be found to amount to excusable delay. 25
Good faith settlement negotiations are also likely to constitute a rea-
sonable excuse, especially if defendant violates any agreed terms. 26 If
the plaintiff makes prior unsuccessful attempts to arrest the defendant's
ship, this is also likely to point to reasonable delay. 27 If a plaintiff
delays in bringing suit in order to allow general average adjustments to
be made, this is also a good excuse for delay. 2 Additionally, if the
defendant threatens the plaintiff's employment, this can point to ex-
cusable delay, 12 9 but the plaintiff's mere vague fear of loss of employment
will not suffice. 30 Bad faith on the part of either plaintiff or defendant
can swing the balance.'
It is possible that, generally, courts are more inclined to apply laches
in in personam actions than in in rem or quasi in rem actions. This is
because the admiralty context does not impose any special burden on
the in personam plaintiff relative to the filing and service of suit. 3 2
With the in rem and quasi in rem actions, of course, things are different.
In that type of case, plaintiffs have the unusual difficulty of locating
123. Akers v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 344 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1965).
124. United Brands Co. v. M.V. Isla Plaza, 770 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
125. Jones v. Reagan, 748 F.2d 1331, 1335 (9th Cir. 1984).
126. Chantier Naval Voisin v. M/Y Daybreak, 677 F. Supp. 1563, 1570 (S.D. Fla.
1988).
127. Id.
128. Deutsche Shell Tanker-Gesellschaft v. Placid Ref. Co., 767 F. Supp. 762, 781
(E.D. La. 1991).
129. Taylor v. Crain, 195 F.2d 163, 165 (3d Cir. 1952).
130. Delpy v. Crowley Launch & Tugboat Co., 99 F.2d 36, 37 (9th Cir. 1938); Chantier,
677 F. Supp. 1563.
131. Chantier, 677 F. Supp. 1563.
132. Claussen v. Mene Grande Oil Co., 275 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1960) (in personam
case reviewing whether plaintiff had been diligent in not bringing a prior in rem action);
see also Chantier, 677 F. Supp. 1563.
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the ship for long enough to seize it. Courts also must consider what
steps the plaintiff should have taken in order to locate the ship sooner.'33
This is a difficult analysis, involving, as it does, the following issues:
(1) the resources available to plaintiff for the search, (2) plaintiff's
sophistication, (3) the size of the claim, (4) whether claimant has other
ships which could be seized quasi in rem, (5) whether the claimant is
American, or whether its ship (or ships) regularly frequented plaintiff's
home port (or American ports), (6) whether plaintiff has attempted to
lien the vessel in. a foreign jurisdiction, and whether this course of
action, if available, would have been reasonable, and (7) the practical
elusiveness of the vessel.1 4 Such a review needs to be done on an
equitable, case-by-case basis. If the plaintiff is a seaman, he, as a ward
of the court, may be better placed in the delay analysis.' 35 On the other
hand, the ease of modern communications serves to make delay less
excusable.
Procedurally, laches claims are rarely dispensed with by motion. 3 6
The dual issues of prejudice and delay usually give rise to matters of
material fact. As alluded to above, laches is committed to the sound
discretion of the district court, but, of course, when a district court is
mistaken in law, appellate review will be made on the de novo standard.' 7
VI. Policy Review
As a matter of policy, and in terms of present day realities, the
writers find that, for purposes of prescription, admiralty suits should
be divided into those filed in personam, and those filed in rem or quasi
in rem. It is not clear why in personam suits in admiralty should have,
as a prescriptive rule, the now-liberal laches doctrine.
Consider the following hypotheticals. A, a New Orleans stevedore,
enters into a contract to unload a ship for B, a Florida shipowner. B
fails to pay. A contract to load or unload a ship sounds in admiralty.
When suing B, A has the benefit of the laches doctrine. X, a New
Orleans ship agent, enters into a contract to service B's ships when they
dock in New Orleans. B fails to pay. A contract of ship agency does
not sound in admiralty. X, in suing B, is bound by either Louisiana
or Florida prescriptive periods. The writers cannot justify the different
results. Both A and X will have to complete the same process: the
successful filing and service of suit against B, the Floridian shipowner
133. See especially Claussen, 275 F.2d 108.
134. Id.
135. Teal v. Eagle Fleet, Inc., 933 F.2d 341, 345 (5th Cir. 1991); Jones v. Reagan,
748 F.2d 1331, 1337 (9th Cir. 1984) ("seamen's 'wardship" . . . requires the courts to
construe ... ancient admiralty law in a manner most favorable to the seamen").
136. Akers v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 344 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1965); Vega v. The
Malula, 291 F.2d 415, 416 (5th Cir. 1961).
137. See Taurel v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 947 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1991); Espino v.
Ocean Cargo Line, Ltd., 382 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1967).
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defendant. Why then should A be able to take advantage of the laches
doctrine?
The writers believe that in circumstances such as these, the analogous
prescriptive period should be applied, as the old cases say, "mechani-
cally." However, two caveats should be added. Firstly, an admiralty
plaintiff in A's position should be entitled to benefit from the equitable
tolling principles which are available to X, the non-admiralty plaintiff.
Secondly, the defendant, B, should lose the right to plead laches
against A before the analogous prescriptive period has run. The fact
that the plaintiff has acted within the analogous prescriptive period set
by state or federal governments, should, in the in personam context,
amount to a conclusive presumption against time-bar. However, in ex-
treme circumstances, the defendant would still be able to take advantage
of the equitable doctrine of waiver. Waiver constitutes the implied or
express voluntary relinquishment of a right. It has been little used in
admiralty. Importantly, unlike laches, it is not a doctrine of prescription.
Were the writers' suggestions to be adopted, the judicial determination
of what constitutes the analogous prescriptive period would assume much
greater importance.
It is easier to justify a special equitable doctrine of prescription in
in rem or quasi in rem cases. In such a case, the plaintiff must, after
all, enforce his or her rights by seizing a ship. The appropriate ship or
ships may be unavailable for years on end, but, alternatively, may lie
in the plaintiff's back yard for months. It is often difficult for admiralty
plaintiffs, especially small business vendors in America's ports, to work
out which party is responsible, in personam, for their debts. Such
plaintiffs often face a maze of contractual relationships, including agents,
operators, shipowners and charterers. But maritime debts can always be
collected via the classic in rem action, given the availability of the
vessel. 138
In such circumstances, it really is unfair to try to enforce fixed
prescriptive periods. There is a maritime reason for departing from a
normally equitable and predictable prescriptive analysis. And on the
other hand, there is something particularly lax about failing to pursue
an obvious opportunity for an in rem action. The action is so effective:
the res is "responsible" for its associated debt, no matter what cargo
it carries, whose voyage it has embarked on, or whether (subject to
laches) years have passed.
138. The Federal Maritime Lien Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 971 et seq., was amended in 1971
to make the in rem action a more effective tool for admiralty plaintiffs. In other words,
the purpose of the change was to "[p]rotect terminal operators, ship handlers, ship
repairers, stevedores, and other suppliers who in good faith furnish necessaries to a
vessel." M.R. 92-340, 92 Cong. 1st Sess.; reprinted in 1971 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 1363, at 1363.
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The element of special "laxness" can justify, in the authors' sub-
mission, the continuing application of laches to cases where the analogous
prescriptive period has not yet run. In connection with in rem/quasi in
rem actions, the authors would favor the continuing application of laches
in the basic form that it now exists in, say the Fifth Circuit. But courts
should be able to find laches in cases of egregious delay despite lack
of evidence of prejudice.
Using the seven factors set forth above at page 521, the basic
underlying question should be: "What could this particular plaintiff
reasonably have done in this particular set of circumstances." The rules
for quasi in rem actions should be similar, but more leeway should be
afforded to the plaintiff. The quasi in rem procedure is not so easy to
use as is its sister in rem action.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, the writers believe that the trend in admiralty courts
is to look on laches with increasing disfavor. This century's evolution
of the disjunctive rule has served to assist plaintiffs by easing their
burden of proof. Now that there is a definite prescriptive period for
maritime personal injury and death actions, it is possible that there will
be less successful laches defenses. Perhaps the admiralty doctrine of
laches, that "wand of equity," as Justice Brown of the Fifth Circuit
has termed it, has grown "gentler and kinder."'' 9
139. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. C/B Mr. Kim, 345 F.2d 45, 52 (5th Cir.
1960).
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